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ABSTRACT 
Humanitarian assistance is of growing importance to the United States and the 
Department of Defense’s strategic objectives.  Thus, United States combatant commands 
increasingly rely on humanitarian assistance cargo transportation programs to deliver 
material to people in need in their areas of responsibility.  This report analyzes the 
options available to these commands in seeking humanitarian assistance cargo 
transportation.  The report offers a description of current operations, with a specific focus 
on the European area of responsibility, where these programs have had limited activity. 
 The analysis reaches the following conclusions:  (1) currently no transportation 
program exists that focuses on providing a quality of service to combatant commands’ 
humanitarian assistance transportation needs; (2) legal, fiscal, and operational 
mechanisms exist and are outlined to create such a program; and (3) exclusively  
space-available transportation is generally insufficient for providing the quality of service 
that may be required for relationship-building through humanitarian assistance cargo 
transportation, and contract shipping may be necessary.  These conclusions are placed in 
the context of current humanitarian assistance operations, and relevant operational 
considerations are highlighted throughout the report.  The analysis is based on both a 
quantitative model of transportation, as well as detailed conversations with humanitarian 
assistance personnel throughout key Department of Defense organizations. 
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Presidential, national military, individual service, and combatant commander strategic 
documents all list humanitarian assistance as one of the core goals and responsibilities of 
the United States armed forces.  One part of humanitarian assistance programs is the 
transportation of nongovernmental organization cargo from the  
United States to destinations in need.  This report analyzes three programs for the 
transportation of such cargo:  the Denton Program, the Funded Transportation Program, 
and Project Handclasp.  The Denton Program and the Funded Transportation Program are 
employed by the Department of Defense, while Project Handclasp is a Department of the 
Navy program.  All three programs have historically had limited activity to European 
destinations when compared to other geographic areas of responsibility. 
 The three programs operate under different legal authorities, funding sources, and 
operational structures.  The Denton Program’s legal authority comes from the  
United States Code for the Armed Forces, Title 10, Section 402.  It is funded by the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency and United States Transportation Command.  The 
Funded Transportation Program’s legal authority comes from the United States Code for 
the Armed Forces, Title 10, Section 2561, and is funded by the Overseas Humanitarian 
Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid appropriation.  Project Handclasp operates under a 
Chief of Naval Operations instruction and is funded by the Navy. 
 The analysis shows that no transportation program currently exists that focuses on 
providing a quality of service to meet combatant commands’ humanitarian assistance 
transportation needs.  Both Denton and the Funded Transportation Program are a public 
service provided by the Department of Defense to nongovernmental organizations, and 
are driven by applications to the programs from nonmilitary sources.  Project Handclasp 
is a Navy program, with its current focus primarily on Navy missions. 
 The analysis outlines the legal, fiscal, and operational mechanisms that may be 




 commands’ humanitarian assistance transportation needs.  We also employ an analytical 
model of space-available transportation to estimate the shipping capacity to European 
destinations. 
 The analytical model shows that exclusively space-available transportation is 
generally insufficient for providing the quality of service that may be required for 
relationship-building through humanitarian assistance cargo transportation, and that 
contracted shipping may be necessary.  The analytical model further shows only limited 
improvement of combined space-available transportation and contracting over 
contracting alone.  Moreover, from a policy standpoint, while several options for lead 
executor of such a program exist, the recommended option is utilizing existing facilities 
by creating a joint role for Project Handclasp.  In this way, Project Handclasp can execute 
a similar mission for combatant commands as it currently does for the Navy, using 
several new methods of transport.  Project Handclasp has been used by combatant 
commands in the past; however, operational and organizational hurdles must be 





 For years, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from the United States have 
conducted humanitarian relief operations across the world.  In the last several years, the 
military has become increasingly more involved in providing this type of assistance as 
well.  This is evident in the 2011 release of the National Military Strategy, which 
emphasizes the importance of building and strengthening international strategic 
partnerships (Department of Defense, 2011).  In order to support these strategic goals, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) employs two programs, and the Department of the Navy 
(DoN) operates and maintains an additional program, to ship NGO-owned humanitarian 
assistance (HA) cargo to countries in need.  The DoD programs are the Denton Program 
(Denton) and the Funded Transportation Program (FTP), and the DoN program is Project 
Handclasp (PH).  All three programs operate independently of each other through 
different operational guidelines, funding sources, and legal authorities.  However, they all 
work in conjunction with United States government country teams and coordinate 
through representatives of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). 
 In recent years, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has been very 
successful in utilizing these programs for cargo delivery to their area of responsibility 
(AOR).  United States European Command (EUCOM), however, has not enjoyed the 
same amount of success.  For example, in 2009, PH delivered 750 pallets of HA cargo, 
weighing nearly 500,000 pounds, to SOUTHCOM’s AOR, but only one pallet was 
transported to Europe (United States Navy Project Handclasp, 2009).  In the same year, 
FTP shipped just two containers of HA materials to EUCOM, while SOUTHCOM 
received 49 (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2010).  Similarly, in fiscal years 
2010 and 2011, Denton transported 1,208,962 pounds of cargo to 13 countries in 
SOUTHCOM.  In the same period, only 7,000 pounds were delivered to one country in 
EUCOM (Joint Relief International, 2011). 
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B. SCOPE OF STUDY 
 The main objective of this study is to understand why EUCOM is underserved by 
the DoD HA transportation programs.  A secondary goal of this research is to outline 
possible policy changes toward a standardized system that can be used by all combatant 
commanders in order to deliver humanitarian cargo to intended recipients within their 
respective AORs.  In order to provide context to the study, we outline the current 
operational procedures of the three programs and their governing legal authorities.  We 
then recommend possible policy and operational changes to increase the shipping 
capacity of HA material to EUCOM and other combatant commands (COCOMs).  We 
also quantify the benefits of these operational and policy changes through an analytical 
model of HA cargo transportation. 
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II. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT AND CURRENT 
PROGRAM OPERATIONS 
A. IMPORTANCE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
 The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was one of the most devastating natural disasters 
in history, leaving over 200,000 dead and millions homeless in 14 countries.  In response, 
nations from across the world donated over $14 billion in what some deem the largest 
disaster relief effort to date (Jayasuriya and McCawley, 2010).  This natural disaster and 
subsequent relief efforts changed the scale of HA, and also changed the approaches and 
views of the United States government and the DoD toward HA programs.  The current 
EUCOM Commander, Admiral Stavridis states: 
As shown by DoD’s experience in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami, aid 
can produce a significant amount of sustained goodwill toward the United 
States, and particularly toward its military.  Putting a face to the U.S. 
military, especially when the face is that of a doctor performing surgeries, 
or that of a SeaBees team building a medical center, can only be a force 
for improving international relations and creating a positive perception of 
the United States. (2010, p. 142) 
Prior to Stavridis’ job as Commander of EUCOM, he held the position of SOUTHCOM 
Commander, where, in 2006, he initiated several HA missions in South America and the 
Caribbean.  One of the most successful of these operations was Continuing Promise 
2007.  For this mission, the USNS (United States Naval Ship) COMFORT, a hospital 
ship, conducted medical missions in 12 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
The exercise was so successful that it was reinitiated the following year with two 
amphibious ships—one that was deployed to the Pacific and one to the Atlantic.  
Altogether, in 2008, the two amphibious ships treated more than 200,000 patients in 
several countries around the world.   
 The United States Pacific Fleet developed a similar annual operation in 2006, 
called Pacific Partnership.  It was designed to provide HA to countries in the  
United States Pacific Command (PACOM) region.  In 2010, the Pacific Partnership 
interagency operation included 10 partner nations, 19 NGOs, USAID, and the  
United States Public Health Service.  As part of that mission, PH distributed over 58 
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pallets of donated material, worth over $162,000, to six host nations (L. Franchetti, 
personal communication, June 30, 2010). 
 As evidence of the DoD’s increasing awareness of the benefits of HA, through 
missions such as those in South America and the Pacific, the 2011 National Military 
Strategy emphasizes the importance of strengthening and building international relations 
through HA operations: 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities employ the Joint 
Force to address partner needs and sometimes provide opportunities to 
build confidence and trust between erstwhile adversaries.  They also help 
us gain and maintain access and relationships that support our broader 
national interests.  (Department of Defense, 2011, p. 17) 
 In order to achieve these strategic goals, all the COCOMs define the necessary 
steps to build relations in their respective AORs through their Theater Security 
Cooperation (TSC) plans.  Specifically for EUCOM, Stavridis’ priorities focus on 
building and strengthening partnerships with European counterparts: 
While ensuring [EUCOM] readiness to execute military operations in support of 
contingency plans, EUCOM will: 
  1. Build partnerships to enhance security, regional stability, and 
support of global initiatives like ISAF [International Security 
Assistance Force]. 
 
   2. Strengthen NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] collective 
defense and assist its transformation. 
 
   3. Support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
   4.        Counter transnational threats. 
 
   5. Engage Israel, Russia, and Turkey in areas of mutual interest.  
(United States European Command, n. d., p. 7) 
 
To accomplish these objectives, EUCOM must be able to partner with NGOs to 




B. CURRENT DENTON OPERATIONS 
 Denton provides transportation of NGO cargo at no cost to the NGO and is jointly 
administered by USAID, the Department of State (DoS), and DoD.  The program was 
originally created by Jeremiah Denton, a Senator from Alabama, as an amendment to the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  Senator Denton created the program to use space-
available to deliver NGO cargo to third-world countries.  It was not until 1985, however, 
that the program was implemented (Norman, 2011). 
 Since Denton is a DoD program, it is governed by the United States Code (USC) 
for the Armed Forces, Title 10.  Specifically, the legal authority for Denton’s operations 
comes from USC 10, Section 402.  The law states that, notwithstanding other provisions 
of law, “the Secretary of Defense may transport to any country without charge, supplies 
which have been furnished by a nongovernmental source and which are intended for 
humanitarian assistance.  Such supplies may be transported only on a space available 
basis” (Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries, 2011,  
p. 1).  Section 402 continues to describe specific requirements that must be met before 
material can be accepted for shipment.  For example, the material must be in suitable 
condition, adequate arrangements must be made for its distribution in the destination 
county, and there must be a legitimate humanitarian need for it.  Section 402 concludes 
with a yearly reporting requirement to Congress for any cargo shipped using the legal 
authority provided. 
 Since Denton uses strictly space-available on military assets, the costs to the DoD 
are minimal; however, some funding is necessary to administer and facilitate cargo 
movement.  Much of this work is done by the United States Transportation Command 
(TRANSCOM) contractor Joint Relief International (JRI).  The funding for JRI is 
covered by TRANSCOM and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)  
(P. Marshall, personal communication, July 7, 2011). 
 In order to meet each of the requirements in USC 10, Section 402, Denton has a 
specific operational procedure for NGOs to follow, which is outlined in Chapter 12 of 
DoD Instruction 5105.38-M.  First, the NGO donor contacts USAID and fills out an 
online application.  USAID then coordinates approval of the application with DoS and 
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DSCA.  However, before any material is accepted, the donor must complete the 
necessary customs paperwork, obtain a duty-free letter, and identify a legitimate 
consignee of the material in the destination country, as per Section 402, before their 
application can be approved by Denton.  Additionally, the material must be properly 
packaged and a suitable space-available route from the cargo’s origin to its final 
destination must be identified by the JRI contractor.  If no such route exists, the cargo is 
not accepted because it cannot be transported.  The NGO must assume all costs 
associated with customs, packaging, and cargo delivery to the time and place  
of embarkation (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2003). 
 Once an application is accepted and a space-available route is identified, the 
process of moving the cargo can begin.  Joint Relief International (JRI) uses the 
TRANSCOM Single Mobility System (SMS), an online tracking system containing 
primarily military aircraft data, to find available transportation channels.  While SMS has 
some functionality targeted specifically at Denton, no automated system exists for finding 
space-available routes.  To facilitate a shipment, JRI contractors must manually search 
possible routes to determine likely space-available channels to the destination.  Accepted 
NGO cargo is classified as Transportation Priority 4 (TP-4) cargo, which is the lowest 
cargo classification level in terms of priority in the DoD logistics system.  JRI is able to 
track the cargo electronically, using a Transportation Cargo Number on the Global Air 
Transportation Execution System and on a system called Integrated Data 
Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence, as well as through personal 
communications between JRI and personnel at transshipment locations.  JRI tracks the 
cargo until its final destination, where USAID representatives, as well as United States 
military personnel involved with the cargo’s transportation, coordinate with a 
prearranged consignee to properly distribute the donations to the intended recipients  
(K. Hundemer, personal communication, June 28, 2011). 
 Denton cargo can be shipped quickly on a well-utilized, space-available route 
once the cargo is accepted.  For example, the process typically takes less than a week—
and usually no more than two weeks—for cargo travelling through Ramstein Air Force 
Base in Germany to its ultimate destination (D. Noe, personal communication,  
 7
June 2, 2011).  However, the application process for cargo acceptance can take time, and 
material is not always guaranteed to be accepted due to various aforementioned reasons. 
At its core, Denton is designed to be a public service offered by the DoD to NGO 
donors, who drive the process through their initial applications.  Although the donors 
must cover some incurring costs and complete the required paperwork prior to material 
acceptance, the program offers the NGO donors a benefit by providing transportation at 
no cost.  Denton realizes this, so, in order to avoid being inundated with requests from a 
single NGO, they have implemented policies to be fair to all NGOs.  For example, the 
program will typically accept only one shipment per NGO at a time. 
 Legally, Denton can use space-available pallet positions on any military asset for 
transportation.  However, the Navy and other services do not use SMS for tracking, so 
Denton has limited visibility of Navy shipping and space available on aircraft other than 
that of the Air Force.  As a result, Denton only uses Air Force channel, contingency, and 
Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) flights for space-available cargo 
transportation. 
 There are several reasons for the limited use of Denton in the EUCOM AOR, 
compared to other AORs.  One reason is that shipment applications are initiated by 
NGOs.  Without NGO applications with a European destination, no material can be 
delivered to Europe.  The lack of applications for European destinations is due to several 
factors.  First, NGOs often donate material in response to perceived high poverty levels 
or a natural disaster, such as the earthquake that devastated Haiti in 2010.  Thus, a large 
number of NGOs apply for transportation to the SOUTHCOM or PACOM AORs 
because of their countries’ high susceptibility to these types of disasters and their 
perceived poverty levels.  Second, SOUTHCOM and United States Central Command 
(CENTCOM) have a much higher frequency of inbound DoD transportation assets than 
EUCOM, due to the proximity of SOUTHCOM to the United States and the high number 
of contingency missions flying to CENTCOM to support the war efforts.  As a result, 
NGOs take advantage of these opportunities and apply for delivery to countries within 
the aforementioned AORs instead of to EUCOM, where the main countries of interest 
have a much lower frequency of available DoD transportation channels.  A Denton 
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application for transportation to these remote European locations may be rejected because 
potential suitable delivery routes cannot be found.  The drawdown of operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan will further reduce the number of space-available pallet positions to 
European destinations because, typically, Denton cargo transported to Europe utilizes 
contingency missions that are maintained in order to support the efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (K. Hundemer, personal communication, December 10, 2011). 
 A final limiting factor to Denton operations is staffing.  Although JRI utilizes 
computer systems, such as SMS, to identify available routes, cargo delivery and mission 
success are ultimately reliant on person-to-person coordination and networking in order 
to find space available in a timely fashion.  The process is by no means automated.  
Additionally, verifying NGO requests, finding space-available routes, and tracking 
shipments can be a labor-intensive process that is often limited not necessarily by lack of 
space-available transportation, but rather by a limited amount of manpower.  As a result, 
if difficult-to-identify-and-administer space-available routes do exist, they may remain 
unutilized. 
C. CURRENT FUNDED TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 
 FTP also provides transportation for NGO-owned cargo at no cost to the NGO.  
The program is administered by DSCA, and the program derives its legal authority 
through USC 10, Section 2561.  The section states “funds authorized to be appropriated 
to the Department of Defense for . . . humanitarian assistance shall be used for the 
purpose of providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian 
purposes worldwide” (Humanitarian Assistance, 2011, p. 1).  It concludes with an 
explanation of the annual reporting requirement to Congress for any funds that are used 
for humanitarian relief and humanitarian cargo transportation missions funded by the 
DoD. 
 Funds for FTP and several other programs are provided yearly by the Overseas 
Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation.  FTP 
receives a variable amount each year that usually totals approximately $1.5 million to be 
used for all FTP transportation worldwide. 
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 Operationally, FTP is similar to Denton.  In both cases, the process is initiated by 
an NGO submitting an application.  In the case of FTP, the application is handled by 
DSCA.  The NGO application and cargo for FTP have the same requirements as Denton:  
the cargo must have a legitimate humanitarian purpose, it must be packaged properly, 
customs paperwork with a duty-free letter must be completed, and a consignee of the 
material in the destination country must be identified and verified before the application 
is approved (Funded Transportation Program, 2011).  Because FTP purchases 
transportation for the cargo from outside contractors, route identification is not a 
necessary step.  The funds required for transporting a specific NGO request can be 
estimated using the TRANSCOM SMS.  Applications are accepted on a first-come,  
first-served basis until the yearly funding is exhausted. 
 At its core, FTP is essentially an extension of Denton, intended to reach 
destinations that are not accessible to space-available transportation assets.  Similar to 
Denton, FTP is a public service by the DoD to NGOs.  In the past, the two programs have 
been administered by DSCA, which accounts for their similar operational requirements.  
NGOs also drive the FTP process through their initial applications, as is the case with 
Denton. 
 FTP derives its authority from USC 10, Section 2561; however, it is not the only 
expression of that authority.  Section 2561 allows DoD to use correct appropriations for 
humanitarian purposes, but does not contain the explicit requirements of Section 402, the 
Denton amendment.  Thus, it is possible for other programs to exist under Section 2561 
that do not explicitly follow the Denton model of transport.  In particular, Section 2561 
does allow for HA programs that are not driven by an NGO request for transportation to a 
predetermined consignee. 
 FTP’s underutilization in EUCOM, as compared to other AORs, is a result of 
several factors.  First, similar to Denton, if no NGO applications requesting shipment to 
European destinations are submitted, then no material is transported to EUCOM by FTP.  
Second, because FTP is a public service to NGOs and operates on a first-come, first-
served basis, delivery locations are a result of NGO requests, and there is no expectation 
of an even distribution of HA material among AORs.  Third, for destinations in former 
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Soviet republics of Eastern Europe, the DoS funds a similar program administered 
through Counterpart International that services some NGO demand for Europe 
(Counterpart International, 2012).  Finally, FTP is limited by funding appropriated by 
Congress.  Once the funding for the fiscal year is exhausted, the program cannot make 
further shipments. 
D. CURRENT PROJECT HANDCLASP OPERATIONS 
 PH is a DoN program, implemented by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 
1962 to support Navy humanitarian missions.  PH is governed by a CNO instruction that 
outlines its mission and operational goals.  Its primary purpose is to enhance the 
perceptions of the United States and the Navy through direct, person-to-person contact 
between United States Navy and Marine Corps personnel and people overseas.  PH may 
also arrange for space-available transportation of NGO material to consigned recipients 
overseas, as long as that material fits into the categories outlined in the instruction.  PH 
falls under the direction and strategic guidance of the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV) for Operations Plans and Strategy International Engagement 
Division (N52).  OPNAV N52 is the program sponsor and is responsible for the PH 
instruction.  Consequently, PH provides quarterly reports to OPNAV N52 measuring 
program performance and providing updates on administration, expenses, and manning. 
 Since PH is a DoN program executing a Navy mission, its operations are funded 
by DoN.  In recent years, some COCOMs have assigned their personnel to assist PH in 
enhancing its ability to deliver material to the COCOMs’ AORs.  For instance, 
SOUTHCOM previously sent an officer to PH to facilitate the delivery of HA supplies to 
SOUTHCOM, and an officer from EUCOM is currently assigned to a similar position at 
PH for the EUCOM AOR. 
 The operations of PH are facilitated by two separate legal entities.  The first is 
itself, and the second is a nonprofit NGO called the Project Handclasp Foundation, Inc. 
(PHF).  The PH transportation process begins with a donation to PHF from a corporation, 
a public service organization, or an individual.  PHF assumes legal title of the material 
once it is donated.   
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While legal title to the material is held by PHF, PH is operationally in charge of 
receiving, collecting, inspecting, consolidating, storing, and transporting the donated 
material. 
 Donated material falls under two distinct categories:  consigned or unconsigned.  
Consigned donations have a particular recipient or geographic area targeted by the donor.  
According to the PH instruction, consigned material is only accepted if the donor’s 
objectives contribute to the overall mission of PH (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2006).  For consigned material, PH provides transportation strictly on a 
space-available basis and the donor arranges for distribution to the identified consignee.  
In contrast, unconsigned donations are essentially goodwill material that can be used at 
the discretion of PH. 
 PH receives donations and is able to store them in a warehouse in San Diego with 
capacity for approximately 3,000 Navy pallets (15 feet long by 18 feet wide).  Following 
the CNO instruction, the material is properly inspected and often repackaged to meet 
transportation requirements.  The material is then stored in the warehouse until an 
appropriate Navy mission is identified for the material’s overseas distribution.  To 
identify destinations for unconsigned material, Navy Component Commands (NCCs) 
communicate their HA needs to PH, who then arranges for transportation and distribution 
as necessary.  Throughout the entire process for both consigned and unconsigned 
material, PHF maintains the legal title to the donations; the Navy never legally owns 
donated material. 
 PH does not use a centralized system, such as SMS, to find space-available 
transportation.  Rather, they have access to Navy schedules through direct contact with 
fleet commanders.  PH also tracks shipments through direct communication with ships’ 
crews.  Recently, PH has been part of a number of Navy missions, including Continuing 
Promise and Pacific Partnership.  In addition to the warehouse in San Diego, PH has 
access to several forward-deployed staging areas that can store 20 to 100 Navy pallets.  
These staging areas are typically used to hold supplies for unforeseen disaster relief 
operations.  Occasionally, as a secondary mission, they can be used for short-term storage 
to facilitate transportation.   
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One such staging area is located in the EUCOM AOR in Rota, Spain.  Others are located 
in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Norfolk, Virginia; Mayport, Florida; Singapore; and Yokosuka, 
Japan. 
 At its core, PH is a Navy program, funded by the Navy, and executing a Navy 
mission.  As such, PH only has the authority to use Navy space-available assets.  PH’s 
transportation ability is limited by ship schedules, which are often unreliable and much 
more infrequent than the Air Force aircraft routes used by Denton.  The program is also 
labor-intensive and limitations are not necessarily the result of a deficiency of space-
available opportunities, but rather a limit on the manpower that is necessary to maintain 
private partner relationships and take advantage of transportation opportunities. 
 PH contrasts with the other two programs in one key area:  both Denton and FTP 
are a public service by the DoD, driven by NGO requests for transportation, whereas PH 
is driven by Navy mission requirements to improve the perception of the United States 
Navy overseas.  As an explicit example, PH can receive unconsigned donations and 
distribute them based on NCC requirements.  Once transported, the unconsigned PH 
material is ultimately distributed to the recipient by uniformed Navy or Marine Corps 
personnel. 
 PH’s distribution of HA material in the EUCOM AOR has been limited.  The 
main reason is PH’s inability to use anything other than Navy assets, particularly space 
available on ships.  The countries to which EUCOM strives to provide HA typically do 
not have regularly scheduled ship port visits.  Thus, the opportunities for PH to schedule 
cargo deliveries are infrequent.  EUCOM is also at a disadvantage because scheduled 
humanitarian missions, such as Pacific Partnership and Continuing Promise, do not occur 
in their AOR.  These operations carry large amounts of PH material—for example, in 
2009, the Continuing Promise mission accounted for 425 Navy pallets of SOUTHCOM’s 
total 750 pallets from PH.  Such missions historically have not occurred in EUCOM 
because these types of operations are often initiated in response to a natural disaster, in 
the case of Pacific Partnership, or to aid developing countries, as with Continuing 
Promise.  Europe typically does not have the same disaster-related and economic 
challenges faced by countries within the SOUTHCOM and PACOM regions.  However, 
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strategically, building and maintaining relationships is as important in Europe as it is in 
other regions of the world. 
 Finally, a critical component of having effective HA transportation programs is to 
deliver cargo that satisfies a need at the destination.  EUCOM has been at the forefront of 
initiating a pull transportation system, where cargo is only shipped if it satisfies an 
identified requirement at the destination, as opposed to a push transportation system, 
where cargo is shipped if it is available and the channel exists.  Cargo pushed through the 
transportation system increases raw pallet numbers, but it often decreases the 
effectiveness and image of HA transportation programs because it remains unused after 
arriving at its destination.  Denton and FTP address this issue by requiring a 
predetermined consignee to the material.  PH also tries to utilize the pull model by 
shipping material in response to NCC requests.  These requests are based on country 
needs within their respective AORs. 
 14
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The area of humanitarian logistics has been a subject of intense study in the past 
decade due to a high frequency of natural disasters around the world.  Most of the 
research, however, has been conducted on logistical challenges associated almost 
exclusively with disaster relief operations.  Some of these studies suggest qualitative 
policy recommendations, while others approach the problem quantitatively.  Our study 
applies both qualitative research to make policy recommendations and a quantitative 
model that offers insight on the benefits of using different types of transportation.  The 
main difference between our study and the following research is that we address the 
problem of long-term, sustained humanitarian aid operations rather than disaster relief 
missions, which are operationally and logistically different.  Specifically, we consider 
options using all types of space-available transportation for humanitarian cargo using a 
stochastic optimization model. 
 Salmeron, Kline, and Densham (2011) conduct a study that most closely relates to 
our problem of long-term, sustained HA and transportation of HA cargo.  The study 
focuses on using Navy maritime assets for HA.  It applies an optimization model to ship 
scheduling in order to determine the most effective deployment schedules that fulfill 
overseas humanitarian needs.  Our model also considers space available on Navy ships, 
but we take a more holistic approach, looking at all military assets as well as contract 
transportation for cargo delivery. 
Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) also consider the problem of long-term 
developmental HA operations.  They distinguish between this type of HA and emergency 
relief, emphasizing the importance of supply chain agility to address these differences.  
They approach the problem qualitatively offering overarching policy recommendations 
for humanitarian sector principles, notably a more business-like approach to supply chain 
management.  This concept of flexibility within supply chain humanitarian logistics 
relates to the scope of our study in that it acknowledges that the problem of long-term, 
sustained development needs to be addressed differently from emergency relief 
operations. 
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 Thomas and Kopczak (2005) also take a qualitative approach to the problem of 
HA.  Like most of the research we found, their focus is on disaster relief operations.  
However, they identify core challenges, such as inadequacies in technology and 
professional training, which are common among all humanitarian sector operations.  
They offer nonquantitative solutions in the context of supply chain management to 
include developing a professional logistics community, standardizing training, and 
providing meaningful metrics to measure performance, as well as adapting new 
technology. 
Similarly, Lin, Batta, and Rogerson (2009) and Van Wassenhove and Martinez 
(2010) address the problem of disaster relief.  However, more similar to our approach, 
they offer solutions using quantitative operational research techniques.  Lin et al. (2009) 
apply an optimization model to the problem of humanitarian relief logistics, specifically 
in response to an earthquake.  They use an integer programming model to determine 
optimal depot location and number of vehicles while minimizing cost.  To create a 
realistic disaster scenario, they simulate the earthquake using a software program 
developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency that analyzes losses from 
natural disasters.  Likewise, Van Wassenhove and Martinez (2010) apply a stochastic 
optimization model to last mile operations to determine optimal vehicle fleet size for 
relief missions after a disaster occurs. 
Salmeron and Apte (2010) also apply a stochastic optimization model to disaster 
relief operations.  Their model differs from ours in that it is a two-stage model, where the 
first phase focuses on the longer-term problem of resource allocation before the disaster 
happens.  This part of the model aims to minimize casualties by appropriate use of 
resources, such as warehouses, medical facilities, and shelters.  The second phase of the 
model addresses more immediate logistical concerns, such as providing appropriate relief 
with available transportation assets and resources after the disaster has occurred. 
Stochastic optimization proves to be a useful technique in analyzing all types of 
HA problems because of the high amount of uncertainty that occurs in all phases of HA 
operations.  Salmeron and Apte (2010) incorporate stochasticity by modeling high-
probability scenarios.  Since our model does not deal with disaster-driven scenarios, we 
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incorporate randomness in way similar to Evans (1976).   He uses a stochastic maximum 
flow model to obtain an expected value of max flow of a network with random arc 
capacities.  We use a similar model, in which we obtain the expected value by sampling 
from a probability distribution and running the model multiple times. 
 Although we use a similar quantitative stochastic optimization modeling approach 
to most HA research, our study differs from existing literature in the type of problem that 
it addresses.  We attempt to solve only the problem of providing long-term, sustained, 
developmental HA, as opposed to disaster relief.  These are two fundamentally different 
problems that need to be addressed in two distinct ways.  The problem of disaster relief is 
characterized by short-term, massive response.  Logistically, it involves moving a large 
amount of supplies in a short amount of time.  In contrast, developmental humanitarian 
aid operations typically are more long-term and involve the delivery of a smaller amount 
of materials over a sustained period of time.  As a result, our model differs from most HA 
studies that are tailored toward disaster relief.  We also look at the option of space-
available cargo transportation using military assets.  To the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to create a holistic logistical model for space-available transportation routes.  
Especially, in the context of DoD HA programs, this research is the first to analyze the 
aforementioned long-term, peacetime operations, as opposed to disaster relief operations. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA 
The inputs for our model are organized in two separate files:  one pertaining to 
nodes for the model and their associated data, and the other containing information 
regarding the model’s arcs.  Table 1 shows a sample of the node file: 
Table 1.   Sample of the node data file that provides inputs for our networks model. 
NodeName ICAOs Country Port Source/Sink Lat/Lon 
PearlHarbor PHIK U.S. Y Source 21.32/–157.92
DallasTexas KDFW U.S. N Source 32.90/–97.04
Montenegro LYBR LYNI LYPG MON Y Sink 43.00/20.37 
Sigonella LICZ LLIC IT Y Neither 37.40/14.92 
There are three types of nodes in our model:  cargo origins in the United States, 
transshipment nodes, and cargo destinations in Europe.  With each node, we associate 
several pieces of data, which are displayed as columns in the node data file: 
NodeName:  Unique name to identify the node. 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAOs):  Four-digit codes for relevant 
airports.  Since a node may represent a country, there may be more than one ICAO code 
per node to represent the multiple airports in that country. 
Country:  Country in which the port is located. 
Port:  Whether the location is an established shipping port or not. 
Source/Sink:  Whether each node is an origin node (Source), an intermediary node 
(Neither), or a final destination node (Sink). 
Lat/Lon:  The latitude and longitude of each node. 






Table 2.   Sample of the arc data file that provides inputs for our networks model. 
StartNode EndNode ShippingType Cost Capacity/Probability
CherryPoint, NorthCarolina Norfolk AF Air 28.95 1/0.007;0/0.993 
Marseille Sigonella AF Air 131.84 1/0.007;0/0.993 
Palermo Taranto Ship 0.00 1.5/0.008; 0/0.992 
 StartNode:  Starting location of each arc. 
 EndNode:  Ending location of each arc. 
 ShippingType:  Type of shipping associated with each arc.  Four shipping types 
are used in the model:  Air Force (AF) Air, Navy Air, Navy Ship, and Contract. 
Cost:  Cost data in dollars per Air Force pallet for transporting across the edge.  
Cost data is only applicable for Air Force air and Contract transportation types.  All other 
shipping types have a cost of zero because the HA programs can ship for free using both 
Navy ships and Navy aircraft because of different space-available models across services. 
Capacity/Probability:  Pairs of numbers describing the capacity of a particular arc 
and the probability of that capacity (of Air Force pallets) being available.  This 
probability distribution is based on a two-week period.  We use this amount of time 
because this is the longest amount of time that Denton cargo typically stays in one place 
before being shipped to its ultimate destination.  A “1/0.25; 0/0.75” in this column can be 
interpreted as a 25% chance of the arc having a capacity of one Air Force pallet and a 
75% chance of the arc having a capacity of zero pallets in a two-week period. 
 We automatically populate these two input files by using several spreadsheet 
manipulation and programming techniques on the following the data sources. 
1. Sixth Fleet Ship Port Visit Data 
We use three years’ worth of historical data on all Navy ship port visits in Europe 
from Commander, Sixth Fleet (C6F) to derive capacity and probability distributions for 
Navy ship routes in our model.  In those three years, 115 Navy ships conducted port visits 
within this AOR.  Table 3 shows a sample of the port visit data: 
  
 21
Table 3.   Sample of data from C6F on Navy ship port visits in Sixth Fleet from 












SULLIVANS DDG-68 PVST VARNA BULGARIA 2/5/07 2/8/07 4 2007
DONALD 
COOK DDG-75 PVST VARNA BULGARIA 7/6/07 7/7/07 2 2007
The data includes the following information: 
Name:  Name of the visiting vessel. 
Hull:  Class and hull number of the ship.  The class of ship is important because 
we associate different capacities with different classes of ship.  We have a separate data 
file with these capacities that provides typical space available on each ship class. 
Event Type Name:  Purpose of the vessel’s visit to the particular port.  In the 
given example, PVST means that the vessel was conducting a routine port visit. 
Port Name:  Name of the port. 
Country Name:  Country in which the port is located. 
From:  Date the ship arrived at the port. 
Until:  Date the ship departed the port. 
PVST Length:  Number of days the ship remained in port. 
Year:  Year of the port visit. 
2. Navy Air Logistics Office Commander Task Force 63 Data 
We obtain similar data from Navy Air Logistics Office (NALO) located at 
Commander, Task Force 63 (CTF-63) in Naples, Italy.  These data contain flight 
information on all Navy aircraft movement within Sixth Fleet for fiscal years 2008 
through 2011, which totals to 2,519 flight legs.  Table 4 shows a sample of these data: 
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Table 4.   Sample of data from NALO on all Navy aircraft movement within Sixth 
Fleet from 2008 until 2011. 
A/C StartDate(Z) EndDate(Z) Itinerary 
C26 12-Oct-07 13-Oct-07 LIRN LGSA LIRN 
C26 21-Oct-07 24-Oct-07 LIRN LEMO LIRN 
C26 1-Oct-07 2-Oct-07 LIRN LPPT LIEO LIRN 
 Aircraft (A/C):  Identifier of the aircraft flying the mission. 
 StartDate(Z):  Date the aircraft departed for the mission (in zulu time). 
 EndDate(Z):  Date the aircraft returned from the mission (in zulu time). 
 Itinerary:  List of all airports to which the aircraft flew during the mission, by 
ICAO code. 
In the case of these NALO flights, we assume each aircraft has two available 
pallet positions.  This is greater than the amount of space-available we assume for  
Air Force flights as a result of conversations with CTF-63 personnel, who said they 
typically do have some pallet positions available for cargo on their aircraft. 
3. Single Mobility System Data 
The majority of the data is taken from TRANSCOM SMS.  SMS collects data 
from a variety of transportation computer systems to create a database with cargo and 
passenger movement of both contract and Air Force air, sea, and land transportation 
assets.  From this database, we extract data pertaining only to Air Force missions flown 
to airports in the 17 destination countries in EUCOM AOR within the past three years.  




Table 5.   Sample of SMS data on Air Force missions to the 17 destination countries 
in Europe from 2008 until 2011. 
ACMDS DATE-TIME ICAO Itinerary Mission Number Mission Type 


















B74720 14/AUG/2011 2050 EBLG KDOV EBLG LTAG BBR6X390A226 CHANL 
 Aircraft Mission, Design, Series (ACMDS):  Aircraft identifier. 
 DATE-TIME:  Date and time for the arrival or departure of the aircraft at that 
particular ICAO. 
 ICAO:  Same as in Table 1. 
 Itinerary:  List of all the airports at which the aircraft made a stop on this 
particular mission. 
 Mission Number:  Unique identifier for the mission.  This code is used to the track 
the flight from origin to destination, across the entire itinerary. 
 Mission Type:  Type of mission.  The most common types are “channel” and 
“contingency.”  Channel flights are routes scheduled to run at a normal frequency from 
airfield to airfield, whereas contingency missions are not regularly scheduled.  
Contingency missions are missions arranged by an organization—military or 
nonmilitary—for a specific mission. 
We automatically identify most of the relevant nodes for the model using the 
SMS data because it contains the most DoD transportation missions to the greatest 
number of locations.  We exclude several nodes in the Middle East and other nodes that 
are out of the scope of EUCOM AOR.  The Middle East locations that are excluded from 
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the model are those that are normally on aircraft contingency routes.  These contingency 
missions to the Middle East are primarily support for Operation Enduring Freedom and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom operations that do not typically carry HA TP-4 cargo because 
they are loaded with higher priority TP-1 and TP-2 cargo and personnel.  The information 
associated with these flight missions is beyond the scope of our model. 
4. Cost Data 
 The cost information in our arc data has been obtained from several sources.  The 
first is from the Air Force Air Mobility Command’s AMC Air Channel Sequence Listing 
document.  This document contains cost rates per cubic foot for TP-4 cargo transport.  
We perform a simple regression on these data points in order to obtain an average cost 
per pallet per mile, which is approximately twenty cents, for aircraft transportation to 
EUCOM AOR. 
 In addition, we obtain an average cost of shipping a container from the  
United States to Europe by contract shipping from 715 contract cost estimates from the 
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC).  These data contain detailed 
information on rates for moving cargo via shipping between ports worldwide.  Also from 
SDDC, we have data containing rates for shipping cargo by ground between various 
locations.  These rates are tiered according to amount of mileage.  For example, 0–50 
miles may have one cost per mile, while 50–100 miles would have a different cost.  
These costs vary by country.  For each distance tier, we average the costs across 
European countries to obtain an average cost for that distance tier.  We compute the great 
circle distance between two European nodes, and use the corresponding average tier cost 
to derive the cost of transportation between the nodes. 
B. BASIC MODEL 
We use a stochastic, maximum flow optimization formulation to model 




  N:  set of all nodes    [~100] 
  O:  set of origin nodes    [~30] 
  D:  set of destination nodes   [~20] 
  A:  set of all arcs    [~10,000] 
  :  set of transportation scenarios  [~310,000] 
 Indices: 
  i,j:  nodes 
Data: 
  si:  relative importance of destination i (no units) 
  :  capacity of edge ij under scenario (Air Force pallets) 
  cij:  cost for shipping on arc ij (dollar per Air Force pallet) 
  b:  transportation budget per scenario time period (dollars) 
  p :  probability of scenario  
 Variables: 
  yij:  flow on arc ij under scenario  (Air Force pallets) 
  vi: cargo entering or leaving the system at node i (Air Force pallets) 
  :  weighted cargo transported under scenario under (weighted Air  
Force pallets) 




























The objective function (1) maximizes the importance-weighted cargo flow to 
destination nodes in the model.  The si used are notional and do not reflect actual values 
used by C6F.  Constraint (2) stipulates that vj cargo enters the system in origin node j.  
Constraint (3) stipulates that vj cargo leaves the system in destination node j.  According 
to Constraint (4), for all nodes that are neither origin nor destination, the number of 
pallets arriving to the node must be equal to the number of pallets leaving the node.  
Constraint (5) is a cost constraint requiring that the total cost spent for transportation over 
all arcs is less than the transportation budget b.  Constraint (6) specifies that for each arc 
ij, the number of pallets traversing the arc must be less than or equal to the random 
capacity associated with the arc.  Finally, Constraints (7) and (8) are non-negativity 
constraints for the number of pallets moving from node i to node j and the amount of 
cargo entering and leaving the system at any origin or destination. 
C. RANDOMNESS AND SCENARIO GENERATION 
 The difference between our model and a typical maximum flow network model is 
the stochastic capacities on the arcs.  We incorporate randomness into our model by using 
the pairs (capacity, probability) from the arc data as a capacity probability distribution for 
.  To evaluate the effectiveness of the transportation system, we sample the 
capacity values from our probability distribution from our arc data for each edge.  The 
result of the model using one of these samples is , the objective function 
representing cargo flow for a two-week period.  By running the model 1,000 times with a 
different sample each time and taking the average, we obtain an estimate of the expected 
shipping capacity for the network. 
 We evaluate four different modes of operation for the transportation network:  
Navy space-available only, Air Force space-available only, contracted delivery only, and 
all modes combined.  For each of the four modes of operation, we analyze the network’s 
ability to move cargo from the United States to each of the 17 countries of interest in the 
EUCOM AOR.  Our results are based on a total of 68 evaluations of the model in Section 
VI.B, each differing based on the available arcs, as specified by the mode of operation, 





each evaluation, the cargo is allowed to originate in any part of the United States, but 
must use only transportation edges allowed in the scenario, and must be delivered to the 
destination country of the scenario. 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. MODEL RESULTS 
Figures 1 through 4 show the network and all available channels for both sea 
lanes and air routes originating in the continental United States (CONUS) and arriving in 
1 of the 17 destinations to which EUCOM provides HA. 
 
Figure 1.   A map of all Air Force aircraft routes in the model originating from the 
United States.  Red dots represent possible cargo origins, green dots 
represent transshipment locations, and the green edges represent an 
aircraft route identified from SMS data. 
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Figure 2.   A map of all Air Force aircraft routes in the model arriving in Europe.  
Green dots represent transshipment locations, yellow dots represent 
destination nodes, and the green edges represent aircraft routes identified 
from SMS data. 
 
Figure 3.   A map of all Navy routes in the model originating from the United States.  
Red dots represent cargo origins, green dots represent transshipment 




Figure 4.   A map of all Navy routes in the model arriving in Europe.  Green dots 
represent transshipment nodes, yellow dots represent destination nodes, 
and blue edges represent routes identified from C6F or NALO data. 
 We divide the available logistic channels into three categories—Navy channels 
including Navy ships and NALO flights, Air Force aircraft channels, and contract 
channels—and create a logistic model for each kind of transportation.  A Navy  
channel-only network models transportation that only uses space available on Navy 
assets.  An Air Force channel-only network models transportation that only uses space 
available on Air Force aircraft.  A contract channel-only network models cargo 
movement using only contracted transportation.  Finally, we create a fourth network that 
models combined operations of all three modes of transportation. 
 We analyze several logistic scenarios.  For each of the four networks, we analyze 
the network’s ability to move cargo from the United States to each of the 17 countries of 
interest in the EUCOM AOR, for a total of 68 evaluations of the model.  In each scenario, 
the cargo is allowed to originate in any part of the United States, but must use only 
transportation edges allowed in the scenario, and must be delivered to the destination 
country of the scenario. 
Figure 5 visually depicts one such scenario, transporting cargo to Montenegro 
using only space available on Air Force aircraft.  For this scenario, the model shows that, 
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on average, space available on Air Force aircraft is able to support approximately 0.45 
pallets per two-week time period.  This is an average shipment amount per unit time, and 
operationally translates into the ability to ship a single pallet about every month and a 
half.  The model also identifies the legs from McGuire to Ramstein, Dover to Ramstein, 
Bangor International to Ramstein, and Ramstein to Montenegro as the essential channels 
for delivering this cargo.  In the diagram, these types of channels with a high reliability 
are shown as thicker, brighter edges.  Thinner, darker edges are those routes that are more 
infrequent and less reliable for cargo transportation.  These results reflect a 100% 
utilization of space-available routes if they exist.  In reality, human operators may not be 
able to achieve such utilization rates, and thus the numbers indicate an upper-bound on 
performance.  The upper-bounds are informative, and later in this section we compare 
results from lower utilization rates with these optimistic upper-bounds.  Unless otherwise 
specified, the numbers for space-available logistic networks in this section reflect full 
utilization. 
 
Figure 5.   Scenario of transporting cargo to Montenegro using only space available 
on Air Force aircraft.  Yellow dots represent possible cargo destinations 
and green dots represent possible transshipment locations.  The edge 
colors and thicknesses represent the relative usage of those shipping 
routes.  No edges are drawn when no route exists. 
 Table 6 lists the performance of various logistic networks for four hypothetical 
HA transportation instances.  The four instances were derived from discussions with the 
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HA transportation programs and are based on likely availability of cargo and EUCOM 
HA requirements.  The instances include:  (1) shipping two pallets of school supplies 
from San Diego to Albania; (2) shipping two pallets of water filters from San Diego to 
Bosnia; (3) shipping an x-ray machine, approximately two pallets in size, from  
San Diego to Croatia; and (4) shipping two pallets of school supplies starting from 
Campbell Air Force Base (AFB) to Azerbaijan.  The results assume a 2–4 week lag time 
for contractors to execute shipments.  For a combined operation, if a space-available 
transportation leg that decreases total costs exists, it is combined with contracting to limit 
costs.  Our results indicate that using only space-available transportation networks is 
insufficient for transporting COCOM HA cargo.  In addition, the comparison of the 
contract network versus the combined operation network indicates that combined 
operation of space available plus contracting offers little benefit over contracting alone. 
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Table 6.   Performance of four logistic networks against four hypothetical HA 
transportation instances.  The results indicate that exclusively space-
available networks (Navy and Air Force) are insufficient to transport HA 
material in a timely manner.  In addition, a combined operation offers 
limited advantages over pure contracting.  All pallets are standard  
Air Force pallets.  Estimated transportation costs are rounded to the 
nearest one hundred dollars.  The designation “N/A” stands for “not 
available” and means that transport using this logistic network is not 
possible because a feasible route is highly unlikely.  The exclusively 
space-available networks (Navy and Air Force) can have slightly 
improved performance if any origin from CONUS can be used to initiate 
space-available transport.  The expected wait times to EUCOM 
destinations, if any CONUS origin can be used, are depicted in Figures 6 
and 7. 






San Diego Albania Two pallets of school 
supplies 
Navy N/A N/A 
Air Force N/A N/A 
Contract 2-4 5,000 
Combined 2-4 5,000 
San Diego Bosnia Two pallets of water filters Navy N/A N/A 
Air Force N/A N/A 
Contract 2-4 5,600 
Combined 2-4 5,600 
San Diego Croatia One x-ray machine, about 
two pallets in size 
Navy N/A N/A 
Air Force N/A N/A 
Contract 2-4 5,000 
Combined 2-4 5,000 
Campbell AFB Azerbaijan Two pallets of school 
supplies 
Navy N/A N/A 
Air Force 66 0 
Contract 2-4 6,300 
Combined 2-4 6,200 
 The model yields expected wait times in weeks for Air Force space-available and 
Navy space-available transportation to the 17 destination countries.  Figure 6 shows the 
expected wait times for Air Force space-available transportation and Figure 7 shows the 
expected wait times for Navy space-available transportation.  These wait times contrast 
with the transportation instances in Table 6 because the cargo is assumed to originate in 
any CONUS location where a route is available; for example, through CONUS trucking.  
Of the 17 countries, only five exhibit wait times of less than a year for  
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Air Force space-available transportation:  Romania, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, 
and Georgia.  The low wait times for Azerbaijan and Georgia are likely the result of 
operations in Afghanistan and would change as those operations decrease.  In the case of 
Navy space-available transportation, the performance is similar.  Only five countries, 
Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania, Croatia, and Georgia exhibit wait times of less than a 
year.  Combining these results, even under the optimistic assumption of full utilization of 
space-available routes, currently no military space-available transportation channels exist 
to 11 of the 17 EUCOM destinations of interest. 
 
Figure 6.   A bar graph of expected wait time for Air Force space-available cargo 
transportation, in weeks, by destination country.  The vertical lines above 
the bars represent a 95% confidence interval.  These wait times assume 
that cargo can originate in any CONUS origin, if a space-available route 
from that origin exists.  The wait times also assume an optimistic 100% 
utilization of space-available routes.  Even under such optimistic 
assumptions, only 5 of 17 EUCOM destinations exhibit wait times of less 
than one year. 
 36
 
Figure 7.   A bar graph of expected wait time for Navy space-available cargo 
transportation, in weeks, by destination country.  This network includes 
Navy shipping and NALO flights.  The vertical lines above the bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals.  These wait times assume that cargo 
can originate in any CONUS origin, if a space-available route from that 
origin exists, as well as an optimistic 100% utilization of space-available 
routes.  Even under such optimistic assumptions, only 5 of 17 EUCOM 
destinations exhibit wait times of less than one year. 
 Figure 8 depicts the three best and three worst destinations in terms of 
transportation capability of the combined logistic network.  The three best destinations 
are Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.  The three worst destinations are Georgia, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan.  The figure also depicts the performance of each of the four logistic 
networks, for each of these six country destinations.  As exhibited by the preceding 
results, in general, the space-available networks have very little or no transportation 
capacity.  The contract network and the combined network have roughly the same 
capacity for each destination because combined operations rely on contractors for the 
most part, substituting with space-available when possible.  The best and worst 
destinations differ largely by the estimated contracting cost for shipping a pallet to the 
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destination.  The combined network, because it can combine space-available and 
contracting, is always the logistic network with the highest transportation capacity; 
however, it offers relatively little benefit over contracting alone. 
 
Figure 8.   A bar graph of the average number of pallets delivered for four logistic 
scenarios to the three best-performing countries and the three worst-
performing countries.  The vertical axis represents the average number of 
pallets that can be transported in a two-week time period.  Blue bars 
represent the Navy logistic network, orange bars the contract network, 
gray bars the Air Force network, and yellow bars the combined logistic 
network.  The vertical lines above the bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals for the estimated performance of the network.  Space-available 
networks generally offer little transportation capability to these countries.  
The contracting and combined networks have comparable performance, 
with combined operations outperforming slightly due to marginally 
smaller costs.  For these results, a transportation budget of approximately 
$10,000 per two-week time period is assumed, based on expenditures on 
the order of the FTP annual budget, allocated equally among geographic 
COCOMs and spread evenly throughout the year. 
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Figure 9 depicts the estimated cost of shipping a single pallet from San Diego to 
each of the 17 countries of interest in the EUCOM AOR.  The figure contrasts the cost of 
shipping using contracting only as compared to a combined operation that uses  
space-available transportation when present.  A combined operation allows for some 
decrease in cost, ranging from 15% to 30%, but does not offer significant shipping 
improvements.  This is consistent with historic research on peacetime transportation 
using contractors (Lewis, 1995). 
 
Figure 9.   Estimated costs of shipping a single pallet to each EUCOM destination of 
interest.  The orange bars represent costs using contract shipping only.  
The yellow bars represent costs from a combined operation, substituting 
space available for contract when possible.  A combined operation offers 
approximately a 15% to 30% cost decrease over exclusively using 
contractors. 
 
 Finally, Figure 10 represents the total shipping capacity in pallets for a range of 
budget values.  The vertical dashed line is at approximately $10,000 per two weeks, 
which is approximately equal to $260,000 per year—the value of splitting the FTP budget 
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equally among the geographic COCOMs.  The right-most extent of the horizontal axis is 
at a budget of approximately $55,000 per two weeks, or approximately $1.5 million per 
year—the value of the entire annual FTP budget.  The yellow line indicates the 
performance of a combined operation, while the orange line indicates a contract-only 
operation.  For an equal budget allocation, the combined operation offers approximately 
two more pallets per two-week period than a contract-only operation.  This is more 
significant at small budget values, but at a budget value of $10,000 per two weeks, it is 
less than a 30% improvement. 
 
Figure 10.   A comparison of contract-only operations and combined operations at a 
range of budget values.  The vertical dashed line is at approximately 
$10,000 per two weeks, or $250,000 per year—the value of the FTP 
budget, split evenly across the geographic COCOMs.  At this value, a 
combined operation offers less than a 30% increase in capacity when 







B. DISCUSSION OF PROGRAM UTILIZATION OPTIONS 
The current guidance from the United States Secretary of Defense to the COCOM 
HA staffs lists Denton and FTP as the methods for transporting HA material to a 
destination in need (United States Secretary of Defense, 2009).  Operationally, these two 
programs are not focused to address the COCOM relationship-building mission.  The 
programs are a public service by the DoD and are driven by NGO requests instead of 
COCOM priorities.  Currently, there is no lead executor for HA cargo transportation that 
focuses on the COCOM relationship-building missions, requirements, and priorities.  
Table 7 provides a short summary of options for addressing this deficiency.  For the 
remainder of this section, we discuss some of these options in greater detail. 
Table 7.   Summary of options for addressing COCOM HA cargo transportation 
strategic relationship-building mission.  Currently, no agency focuses on 
COCOM priorities for HA cargo transportation. 
Option Discussion Recommended? 
1. Keep current system 
unchanged. 
Provides no quality of service for COCOM 
HA missions.  COCOMs may encourage and 
assist NGO applications for Denton and 
FTP.  COCOMs may ask for assistance to 
task PH through NCCs. 
No 
2. Realign Denton/FTP to 
focus on COCOM 
missions. 
Removes well-utilized and liked DoD 
programs.  Negatively impacts relationships 
with NGOs and partners.  Removes the 
beneficial impact of existing programs. 
No 
3. Give joint role to PH. 
Builds on PH relationships with NGO 
partners and PH experience, expanding the 
program to non-Navy assets.  Requires 
COCOM funding to execute COCOM 
mission.  Requires adjustment and expansion 
of PH operations. 
Yes 
4. Create common execution 
of transportation between 
Denton, FTP, and PH. 
Misapplies Denton and FTP to satisfy 
COCOM relationship-building mission.  Has 
previously been attempted with little 
success.  Provides no quality of service 
guarantee to COCOMs. 
No 
5. Create new program as lead 
executor. 
Does not make use of existing expertise and 
capabilities in current HA cargo 
transportation programs. 
No 
6. Create multiple programs:  
for each service or for each 
COCOM. 
Leads to confusion on the part of NGOs 
willing to assist.  Significantly complicates 
congressional reporting requirements. 
No 
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The three HA transportation programs differ in their ability to execute the 
EUCOM partnership-building mission.  Both the Denton and FTP operate similarly as a 
public service provided by the DoD.  Denton’s purpose, legally and operationally, is to 
facilitate NGO-owned cargo transport for NGOs.  The program is driven by NGO 
requests and, as such, using it to satisfy COCOM theater strategy would be a 
misapplication of the program.  The program may be suitable for occasional requests by 
NGOs that happen to coincide with COCOM strategy, but no regular service for 
COCOMs can be expected.  Because FTP has a similar purpose and operation as Denton, 
similar reasoning shows that it also is not ideal for executing COCOM  
HA missions. 
 One explored method of executing COCOM HA cargo transportation operations 
is using PHF as the acting NGO for Denton and FTP applications.  Theoretically, such an 
approach would provide the PH process with multimodal transportation by giving it 
access to space available on Air Force planes through Denton and some funding from 
FTP.  A SOUTHCOM Naval officer who worked with PH submitted applications on 
behalf of PHF to both Denton and FTP.  These applications were unsuccessful for several 
reasons.  First, the legal authority of Denton requires that the source of the transportation 
request be an NGO.  Initially, because of the normal procedural validations of Denton 
and FTP applications, care had to be taken to ensure that PHF satisfied the legal 
definition of an NGO.  After PHF was confirmed as a legitimate private sector 
organization, it could use the two programs.  However, both Denton and FTP have the 
policy that no special treatment can be given to any one NGO over others.  Thus, under 
this model, no quality-of-service guarantees can be made on PH’s ability to use 
multimodal transportation.  More importantly, this operational model is a misapplication 
of Denton and FTP because it attempts to use them to fulfill COCOM missions instead of 
their intended purpose—to provide a service to NGOs. 
 In contrast with Denton and FTP, PH is designed to be a mission-oriented 
program whose main purpose is to satisfy Navy strategic objectives by increasing 
perceptions of the United States Navy abroad.  COCOM HA missions satisfy similar 
theaterwide strategic objectives.   
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The expertise and experience of PH could be used to achieve a similar mission for 
COCOMs as it does for the Navy:  to improve perception of the United States military 
through the delivery of HA material.  However, a number of operational changes would 
have to occur to facilitate such an expansion of the operations of PH. 
C. METHODS FOR CREATING A JOINT ROLE FOR PROJECT 
HANDCLASP 
 Currently, PH is tasked and funded by the Navy to satisfy Navy mission 
objectives, and is limited to using Navy assets.  To satisfy COCOM HA cargo 
transportation missions, PH would require a joint role that elevates its operations from 
satisfying solely Navy objectives to a standard service available to combatant 
commanders to satisfy COCOM HA cargo transport mission requirements.  A general 
legal and financial outline of achieving this change in PH’s operations consists of the 
following steps: 
1. A COCOM incorporates the need to maintain and build relationships with 
countries in their AOR through Phase 0 programs—including the timely 
delivery of HA cargo—in their TSC strategy and approved operational 
plans. 
2. A COCOM has the authority to organize the services to achieve its 
approved operational plans (Department of Defense, 2008).  This allows a 
COCOM to organize the services to support PH in accessing the DoD’s 
logistic capabilities. 
3. A service, however, does not resource its forces to support COCOM 
objectives.  Thus, a COCOM may also provide funding to achieve its 
approved, Phase 0, HA cargo transport objectives through its regular 
mission-funding routes.  Such a funding step would enable PH to access 
both outside contractor transport and space-available, low-priority DoD 
transport, thus increasing its logistic capabilities beyond the use of only  
Navy assets. 
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4. Any DoD funding used for transportation of HA cargo falls under  
USC 10, Section 2561—the same authority used by FTP—and has the 
same requirements, such as annual reporting to Congress. 
 In order for the COCOMs to achieve their strategic relationship-building 
objectives, the process for transporting HA cargo should be standardized, with a 
predictable quality of service.  Through the steps outlined above, a COCOM identifies 
this as a mission requirement, and funds it through its regular mission-funding pathways; 
for example, its OHDACA funds.  It grants PH the ability to place cargo onto non-Navy 
and outside contractor assets for transportation of material that achieves the  
COCOM mission. 
 Operationally, a joint role for PH would allow for direct tasking of PH by 
COCOM HA staff.  The current PH tasking by NCCs, combined with a lack of 
communication between NCCs and COCOMs, can lead to COCOM misperception of PH 
shipments as push shipments, even for deliveries initiated by NCC requests.  Moreover, 
NCCs do not have dedicated staff for HA missions, as do COCOMs.  Thus, direct tasking 
of PH by COCOM HA staff would increase transparency of shipments and improve the 
responsiveness of PH to COCOM theater objectives. 
 Direct tasking could be performed in the following manner.  A COCOM could 
work with their local USAID representatives and the country teams to coordinate a 
priority list of material that would help with partnership-building.  Such a priority list 
could be published and given regularly to PH to match these requests with donated 
materials in the PH inventory.  Once material is identified, the COCOM HA staff, in 
conjunction with the recipient country team, could obtain the necessary duty-free and 
customs paperwork from the recipient country, and transportation could be executed by 
PH.  Direct tasking by the COCOM HA staff would reinforce a pull transportation system 
for procuring needed material to the COCOM AOR vice pushing HA donations that 
recipient countries may or may not need.  Because COCOMs would resource PH’s joint 
role, the performance of PH could be measured not by pallets or total weight, but by the 
number of shipments that satisfy a COCOM’s HA priorities. 
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 Even with a joint role, PH would continue to execute its Navy mission.  PH is 
well-positioned within the Navy’s logistic organizations, and has good administrative 
support.  Thus, it would be inadvisable to move PH to a different organization.  Instead, 
the Navy could be designated as the executive agent for COCOM HA cargo 
transportation requirements and PH could provide transparency and work with DSCA to 
prepare the annual reports to Congress.  Creating a joint role for PH could pose relatively 
little administrative and operational effort and only a few policy changes, but would 
require high-level tasking from COCOMs, Navy commanders, and DoD  
HA officials. 
 Throughout the process, care must be taken on several legal requirements.  First, 
at no point should donations be solicited from outside agencies.  Second, cargo 
transported through HA transportation programs should satisfy a legitimate humanitarian 
need.  Third, congressional reporting requirements for use of HA funding and 




A. UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
 EUCOM would like to partner with NGOs and use deliveries of NGO-owned 
material to build and maintain strategic relationships within their AOR.  Delivery of HA 
material and direct involvement by DoD personnel improves perception of the DoD and 
its mission.  The effects of these donations remain long after the material is distributed, 
helping to build long-lasting partnerships with foreign nations.  By providing the 
mechanism for HA cargo delivery to countries in need, EUCOM is able to make steps 
toward regional security and stability, which consequently impacts the support our 
partners provide toward our global initiatives (United States European Command, n. d.). 
B. MODEL CONCLUSIONS 
 The results of our analytical model indicate that space-available transportation is 
insufficient to address EUCOM HA shipping requirements.  In addition, a cost 
comparison between contract-only operations and combined operations shows limited 
improvement for a combined operation.  This, combined with the relatively easy 
execution of contract-only operations, suggests that allowing for contract transportation 
of EUCOM HA material may be a reasonable method of providing quality service for the 
COCOM relationship-building mission at a relatively low cost. 
 While the model presented here is derived using current and thorough input data, 
as well as modern modeling techniques, in any model there is no way of accounting for 
the multitude and complexity of human factors that make the real-world logistics 
operations work.  Although critical to daily operations, these are elements that are 
impossible to model mathematically.  Nevertheless, model results can provide insights 




C. FUTURE WORK 
 The method described in this paper provides a way for combatant commanders to 
evaluate the performance of DoD HA programs, given an operational budget, in order to 
achieve their strategic goals.  We use a network model in which the stochasticity comes 
from an empirical distribution on available capacities derived from historical 
transportation data.  This method is effective for the purpose of this initial study.  
However, there are several other ways these data could be analyzed to incorporate a few 
aspects of this problem that are not included in the current model. 
 Devising a time-phased model similar to Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993) to 
evaluate the introduction of potential storage locations could result in transportation 
systems with increased reliability.  A time-phased model could provide insights regarding 
optimal locations to build or maintain a storage facility, or how to effectively utilize 
existing storage facilities for forward-staging materials within the AOR.  Further 
developments could provide recommendations on the types of materials to forward-stage, 
as well as the time period and location in which to store them.  This potential avenue of 
study could also model stochastic demands, in the sense of probabilities that certain 
countries need certain materials at certain times. 
 In the case of EUCOM, destination country needs are fairly predictable since they 
are not primarily in response to a natural disaster.  The problem of disaster relief requires 
a different model from our less time-sensitive approach.  In the case of EUCOM, an 
effective method of delivering development aid is necessary, whereas in other COCOMs, 
such as PACOM, an effective disaster relief method may be much more relevant. 
 A non-quantitative area of future study in which all COCOMs could benefit is the 
potential for PH to be given a joint role in the military.  Since we recommend that PH be 
in the executor of long-term development COCOM HA cargo transportation missions, the 
program would most likely need to become a joint program.  This way, instead of falling 
exclusively under Navy rules and jurisdiction, they would operate under joint guidelines.  
This would also allow PH access to all services’ assets to achieve COCOM HA 
objectives.  However, this is a complicated endeavor that would potentially require 
several legal and procedural changes. 
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 The results from our analytical model assume an optimistic 100% utilization of 
space-available when present.  In reality, human operators are likely unable to achieve 
such a degree of utilization without significant automation improvements.  One effort to 
create such automation improvements is the United States Fleet Forces Command’s Lifts 
of Opportunity/Opportune Lift Program administered by the Navy Supply Logistics 
Operation Center.  The goal of the program is to consider all scheduled conveyances and 
search for opportune lift.  One aspect of the program is an automated Transportation 
Exploitation Tool (TET) available on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
through a collaborative effort with the United States Department of Energy.  The TET 
prototype provides a search capability similar to an internet search engine for opportune 
lift.  This type of technology, if utilized by the DoD HA programs, has the potential to 
change their procedures and operations.  An analysis of the benefit to HA operations 
offered by TET may be a relevant future research question. 
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